SteveK August 20th, 2010

On August 20, 2010, the EPA posted its Draft Clean Water Strategy for review and comment. The Draft resulted from the Coming Together for Clean Water Conference which was hosted by EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson this past April. The Draft identifies the challenges to continuing the efforts launched by the 1972 passage of the Clean Water Act. While acknowledging the significant progress that has occurred since then, the community involved recognizes that much more needs to be done to revitalize the resources. The Draft further presents the significant economic benefits which can be realized from having clean water and in taking the actions and building the infrastructure to achieve the goals. The Draft demonstrates the continued viewpoint that environmental protection is not a drain on economic growth but a significant component of our development.

A copy of the Draft, information on the April conference, and information on providing comments on the draft, can be found on the EPA website at: http://blog.epa.gov/waterforum/ Comments will be accepted until September 17, 2010.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department

Tags: Clean Water Act, Contamination, Environmental Law, Water Resources

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SteveK August 17th, 2010

In NJDEP v. Essex Chemical Corporation, a trial court of the New Jersey Superior Court recently ruled that the NJDEP had failed to prove that contamination to ground water resulted in compensable harm or loss entitling the State to an award of natural resource damages (NRD.)  Essex Chemical had owned and operated a facility where chlorinated volatile organic compounds were handled and later found in ground water. Essex commenced remedial actions under New Jersey law in 1984 and has continued to meet their obligations to conduct site remediation to the present day.

The NJDEP commenced an action for NRD in 2007, contending that the contamination to the ground water has resulted in a compensable loss to the people of the State and entitles the State to damages under the NJ Spill Act. The evidence at trial demonstrated that the remedial work was approved by the NJDEP and complied with the regulations governing site remediation (Tech. Regs.). The State’s expert on resource economics utilized a resource equivalency approach (REA) to support his damage evaluation, positing that the value of the loss can be based upon the cost of land that would support the same recharge to the ground water of the area contaminated. The Court rejected the expert’s opinion holding that it was not convinced that the method of calculation of compensatory damages was proper for the resource in question. The Court acknowledged that the REA approach was appropriate for loss of wildlife (e.g. fish, birds), or where the contamination has an effect on human health. Where, however, no such harm was identified, the Court did not accept the expert’s method of assigning values “to things that are normally invaluable,” presented as “non-use” values.  Since there was no evidence that the land in question will be developed nor any evidence that there was an intention to use the ground water or what it’s “non-use” value would be, the court found in favor of Essex Chemical and dismissed the claims.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

Tags: CERCLA, Environmental Law, Ground water, Natural Resource Damages, NJ Spill Act, NRD, resource equivalence analysis, Spill Act

• Environmental Law , Natural Resource Damages
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SteveK August 17th, 2010

In U.S. v. Iron Mountain Mines, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs against Iron Mountain Mines and T.W. Arman for past costs which had not been resolved in a consent decree in which claims against other PRPs at the Iron Mountain Mines Superfund Site were settled.  The plaintiffs had previously settled with the other PRPs for approximately $154 million of insurance to cover future cleanup costs over 30 years, $10 million for natural resource damages, and an additional $7 million for future clean up not covered by the insurance. The defendants argued that the settlement amounts well exceeded the $26 million in past costs that had been incurred prior to February 29, 1996 which were being sought from them, therefore providing plaintiffs complete recovery.  Defendants argued, further, that it would not be known until after the 30 year period for payment of cleanup under the insurance policy whether the plaintiffs would not be made whole. The plaintiffs argued that no money had been received for the past costs.  The Court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding that the consent decree did not address past costs, but only future remedial costs and NRD. Since Section 113(f)(3) of CERCLA permits suit against non-settling responsible parties if the relief obtained in a settlement was not complete, the Court held for the plaintiffs.

This decision points to the essential need for a party to be informed in every step in the negotiation of a settlement, particularly if they are not a party to the settlement. As in the recent decisions of the 9^t Circuit,  U.S. v Aerojet, and the 10^th Circuit, U.S. v Albert Investment Co., it s important to take an active position, and where appropriate move to intervene,  on a motion or action to approve a CERCLA consent decree. Indeed, it has been acknowledged that CERCLA can impose harsh results on non-settling PRPs. See, United States v. Davis, 261 F. 3d. 1, 28 (1^st Cir. 2001).

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

Tags: CERCLA, Contamination, Environmental Law, Natural Resource Damages

• Environmental Law , Natural Resource Damages
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SteveK August 17th, 2010

On July 22, 2010, in State of California v. Hearthside Residential Corp., the court addressed a question of first impression: “whether the ‘owner and operator status under [CERCLA] is determined at the time that cleanup costs are incurred or instead the time that a recovery lawsuit seeking reimbursement is filed.” The concluded that the owner is determined at the time cleanup costs are incurred.

Hearthside had purchased property known as Fieldstone Property in Huntington Beach, California with the knowledge that it was contaminated with PCBs. Hearthstone entered into a consent order with the State in which it agreed to remediate the property, then sold to the property to the California State Lands Commission. The State determined that the adjacent residential site was also contaminated with PCBs which it alleged had migrated from the Fieldstone Property. The State considered Hearthstone responsible; however, Hearthstone disagreed, contending that it was not the owner when the suit was filed. The State, therefore, contracted to remediate the property and subsequently filed a complaint against Hearthstone.

Since CERCLA does not provide a clear answer to the issue of when a party is considered an owner for purposes of liability, and no case dealt with the issue directly, the court considered other aspects of the statute. The court concluded that the issue best aligns with CERCLA’s statute of limitations. Since the limitations provisions are triggered either (1) at the completion of a removal action, or (2) at the initiation of the remedial action, the court concluded that it was the intent of Congress was to have the statute of limitations “run against (and protect) the owner of the property at the time the cleanup occurs.” The court reasoned that if Hearthstone’s argument were accepted, “an owner could sell a recently cleaned piece of property to an innocent owner one day before the statute of limitations runs, with the result that the new owner would bear full cleanup liability under CERCLA if a recovery action was later timely filed.” Accordingly, the court saw this as contextual evidence of Congressional intent that the owner at the time of cleanup was to be considered the owner for the purpose of CERCLA liability.  In addition, relying on the date of filing of the cost recovery action contradicts the intent to have early settlements. In essence, Hearthside’s approach would require the filing of a suit in order to determine the date of ownership.  In addition, since the owner at the time of cleanup can help determine the scope of cleanup, “it follows that the same owner should be responsible for the cost of the remediation program that it had the opportunity to influence.”

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

Tags: CERCLA, Contamination, Environmental Law, Natural Resource Damages, NRD, Statute of Limitations

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SteveK July 17th, 2010

On July 13, 2010, in Commissioner of the Department of Planning and Natural Resources v. Century Alumina, LLC, et.al., the Federal District Court from the St. Croix division of the Virgin Islands, held that an action to recover natural resource damages (NRD) must be commenced within 3 years of the constructive knowledge of the injury by the trustee.

The plaintiff trustee brought the claim against a number of industrial entities for the release of contaminants onto a number of industrial tracts at various times which injured the land as well as groundwater and the Caribbean Sea.  The defendants moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claims under CERCLA’s limitation of actions provision, which provides that an action for NRD must be commenced within 3 years following “the date of the discovery of the loss and its connection with the release in question.” Although the statute does not state what is meant by “discovery” the court relied upon numerous prior decisions as to other statutes and other aspects of CERCLA to conclude that it is based upon the constructive knowledge of the trustee. The court went on to clarify that the knowledge of the agency, including the knowledge of any prior trustee, would be imputed to the present trustee.  Accordingly, the determination of whether there was NRD related to the discharges would require an analysis of when the trustee knew or should have known that there was an injury to the natural resource related to the discharges, which would commence the running of the time for bringing an action. With this ruling in hand, the court analyzed the facts as to each site and each defendant, dismissing some claims and allowing others to continue.

This case demonstrates that there courts will take a rational approach in considering the relationship between knowledge of a discharge of contaminants and the commencement of NRD claims. The interests of the government to pursue recovery of NRD, while important, will not allow the government to be inattentive to their statutory obligation to act promptly to seek to enforce these rights.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC ( www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

Tags: CERCLA, Contamination, Environmental Law, Ground water, Groundwater, Natural Resource Damages, NRD, Pollution, Statute of Limitations

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SteveK July 16th, 2010

On June 12, 2010, in Mereno v. American Home Products, Inc., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of a claim by Mark Moreno and his mother of defectively manufactured oral polio vaccine (OPV) which had been administered to plaintiff resulting in a brain tumor and permanent disabilities. It was claimed that the vaccine used was defective because the manufacturer failed to screen for infective Simian Virus 40 (SV40).  Since plaintiffs were unable to identify the responsible manufacturer, they named all the companies licensed to manufacture OPV at the relevant time. The Court affirmed that summary judgment was appropriate even though discovery was not complete, because the plaintiff could not show that the outstanding discovery would supply information relevant either to lead to the identity of the manufacturer or to any theory of collective liability.

In analyzing the plaintiffs’ claims of collective liability, the court first considered whether the law of New Jersey or the law of New York applied as evidence indicated that the OPV was administered in New York; however, the plaintiffs have resided in New Jersey for over 35 years. The Court reviewed the various theories of collective liability and concluded that under the laws of both states, they could not be applied in this case.  The court distinguished a New York decision applying market-share liability to the manufacturers of another drug, DES, because the injury did not result from the defective design of the drug, as with DES, but was due to the failure of a manufacturer to comply with federal regulations relevant to screening and neutralization of SV40 and “and produced a defective or deviant vaccine.” The Appellate Court, therefore, concluded that the failure of a single manufacturer to comply with proper manufacturing processes and procedures did not warrant imposition of liability on all the manufacturers of the same product.

This decision continues to reinforce the requirement of proper product identification, and the need for the plaintiff to prove causation-in-fact, and further reviews the limited grounds where a court will shift the burden to defendants to distinguish their product or actions from that of other defendants.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC ( www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contact Steven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

Tags: collective liability, drug liability, Environmental Law, insurance law new jersey, OPV, oral polio vaccine, Products Liability Defense, SV40, Toxic Torts

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SteveK July 9th, 2010

On June 2, 2010, in United States v. Aerojet, the Court of Appeals for the 9^th Circuit allowed non-settling PRPs to intervene, by right, to challenge a CERCLA settlement. By this decision, the 9^th circuit joined the 10^th circuit (See, the December 8^th post reporting on U.S. v. Albert Investment) and the 8^th circuit (U.S. v. Union Electric, a decision from 1995) in ruling that a non-settling PRP has a right to contribution under CERCLA that satisfies the requirements for intervention under the federal rules.

The case involved the U.S. reaching a settlement with a group of PRPs to contribute $8.1 million towards an $87 million cleanup. As usual, the consent decree provided contribution protection to the settling PRPs. As is required, the Department of Justice filed a suit filed to perfect the settlement by a consent decree. After posting the consent decree in the Federal Register, a group of non-settling PRPs filed objections to the settlement. As they were not satisfied that their interests were properly addressed, the non-settling group filed a motion to intervene. The trial court denied the motion which was appealed to the 9^th Circuit and reversed.

The focus of the 9^th Circuit’s decision was whether the settlement would extinguish the non-settling PRP’s contribution rights under Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA. In evaluating the right to intervene under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and Section 113(i) of CERCLA, the court identified the interest at issue as the PRP’s contribution rights and  ensuring that the consent decree “embodies a fair and reasonable allocation of liability.” The court determined that entering the consent decree would cut off the non-settling parties’ contribution rights against those that settled. This, the court held, provided the non-settling parties a protectable interest. In addition, the court noted that settlement may result in the non-settling PRPs becoming responsible for the remaining amount of the cleanup costs.  This would bring into question the defined interest of an appropriate allocation of liability.

This decision brings the majority view to one that favors intervention.  This approach will likely encourage the government to seek global settlements of CERCLA matters, provide encouragement for parties to develop settlements that include all the major parties or groups, and provide greater leverage to certain parties or groups of parties in CERCLA settlement negotiations.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC ( www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contact Steven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

Tags: CERCLA, Environmental Law

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SteveK April 29th, 2010

In the recent unreported decision, Proformance Insurance Co. v. Riggins, the New Jersey Appellate Division addressed a dispute between two insurers as to the responsibility to pay for the demolition of a home necessary for implementation of cost effective environmental remediation, holding that the cost of demolition was not excluded by the owned property exclusion.  In the case, Proformance insured the property owned by Don Kolbe from 2002 until 2004, and MetLife insured it from 2004 until 2006.  A leak was discovered from the underground eating oil tank in 2006.  It was undisputed that the tank had been leaking for four to eight years prior to the discovery.

Proformance acknowledge its obligation to provide coverage, and engaged two consultants to evaluate the options to remediate the property. Each consultant provided two options, one that required demolition of the house, the other allowed the house to remain with structural supports during the process of remediation.  The cost of the demolition option cost approximately $145,000 less than the support option. Proformance elected the more cost effective option.  MetLife agreed to contribute to the remediation, but not for the costs related to demolition, arguing that it constituted damage to owned property. The Court disagreed finding that the house was not damaged by the contamination and that the destruction to the house was not due to “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” The Court held that the decision to destroy the house was “simply a function of the decision to employ the most cost-effective means of addressing covered claims, rather than the product of any ‘occurrence’ as defined in the MetLife policy.”  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the exclusion did not apply. The Court further stated that it saw no rational basis to extend coverage for the costs of the structural option but excluding coverage for the less expensive option of reimbursing the homeowner for the demolition of the residence.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC ( www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and insurance matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental  or insurance practice, please contact Steven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads the Environmental and Insurance Coverage Practice Groups.

Tags: Environmental Law, NJ insurance law

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SteveK April 26th, 2010

In the recent decision in Agere Systems, Inc, et. al. v. Advances Environmental Technologies, LLC, et. al., the 3^rd Circuit Court of Appeals continued the discussion of the complex interaction between sections 107(a) and 113(f) of CERCLA. Agere involved a case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania related to the Boarhead Superfund Site. The EPA commenced a 107(a) action against Cytec, Ford and SPS on June 2, 2000 by filing a complaint along with a consent decree for OU-1. Cytec, Ford and SPS subsequently entered into a separate settlement agreement with Agere, TI and two other companies to collectively fund and perform work for OU-1. The EPA subsequently commenced another 107(a) suit against Cytec, Ford and TI by filing a complaint and a second consent decree related to OU-2.  A private settlement agreement was entered into by the three companies with Agere, which assigned its rights for cost recovery to the group. The parties that had settled subsequently brought an action against Carpenter Technology Corporation to recover costs. After trial, the District Court held Carpenter liable, and allocated a significant share to Carpenter, including an enhanced share based upon the court finding that Carpenter had significant culpability in creating the Superfund site and because of its lack of cooperation in cleaning up the site.

The 3^rd Circuit identified six essential challenges present by Carpenter: 1) the 113(f) claim was time-barred because Carpenter did not share a common liability with the plaintiffs since the EPA claim was filed after the expiration of the time for the filing of such actions, 2) Agere and TI cannot bring a 107(a) action for sums paid in a private settlement with other plaintiffs, as opposed to sums paid by the other parties to the EPA, based upon the provisions of 107(a), 3) the plaintiffs that signed the OU-1 and OU-2 Consent Decrees do not have rights to sue under 107(a); only section 113(f) claims may be pursued, 4) Cytec, Ford, SPS and TI failed to present competent evidence of the total waste they disposed of at the site, and therefore the allocation of liability by the District Court was flawed, 5) the allocation was flawed by a miscalculation of volumetric shares in that the court did not consider the culpability and lack of cooperation of the plaintiffs, and improperly relied upon volumetric shares rather than the dollar amounts collected from the settling defendants, and 6) the limitations of the plaintiffs claims under section 107(a) of  CERCLA should apply to the similar provision in related Pennsylvania law.

The 3^rd Circuit carefully explored each issue and remanded the case to the District Court for further findings. The district court was directed to make further findings on facts related to whether certain claims were time-barred. In addition, the district court was required to make determinations as to the waste volumes based upon appropriate evidence.

The most significant aspect of the decision is the Circuit Court’s exploration of the interaction between Section 107(a) and 113(f) as developed in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. 551 U.S. 128 (2007). The Court noted that in Atlantic Research the Supreme Court held that 107(a) “permits a PRP to recover only the costs is has ‘incurred’ in cleaning up a site,” and that payment to settle a claim does not constitute the incurring of response costs. Since the money paid by TI and Agere to settle the case was placed in a trust to fund the actual work at OU-1 and OU-2, the requirement that the claim be for recovery of response costs was satisfied. The 3^rd Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court did not intend to exclude all settlement payments, particularly where the funds were not reimbursement of costs incurred by others, but were actually used to fund the remedial work.  The Court went on to distinguish the Supreme Court’s statement that the parties that could not make 107(a) claims could still maintain a claim under Section 113(f), noting that it was not intended to provide the opposite; that is, that a party that was precluded from a 113(f) claim would not have a 107(a) claim.  In this case neither Agere nor TI were able to maintain 113(f) claims for contribution because neither were sued by the EPA or the other PRPs. The Court concluded that Congress could not have intended to “penalize cooperative cleanup efforts by excluding from CERCLA’s broad recovery provisions all PRPs who, like Agere and TI, have come forward and assist[ed] in a cleanup even though they have not been subjected to cost recovery suit.” The Court found that such a result would be contrary to the goal of CERCLA “to encourage private parties to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery from others.”

The 3^rd Circuit then went on to consider the 113(f)/107(a) issues regarding the defendants sued by the EPA: Cytec, Ford and SPS. Carpenter argued that those parties had only 113(f) claims since once a party settles the 107(a) claims, it is only entitled to assert 113(f) claims.  The Court noted that the issue of whether a party in the position of Cytec, Ford and SPS may bring a 107(a) claim in addition to a 113(f) claim was left open in Atlantic Research. The 3^rd Circuit noted that if the parties had rights under 107(a) as well as 113(f), the trial court, on remand, could impose 100% of the liability on Carpenter. Further, Carpenter would not be able to resolve this by a Section 113(f) counterclaim since the parties that had settled with the EPA would be shielded from liability under section 113(f)(2).  The Court agreed that this would be a perverse result since the primary goal of CERCLA is to have polluters pay.

The remand to the trial court, therefore, required the court to explore significant issues regarding whether certain aspects of the claim were time barred, and to conduct a fact intensive analysis to support an allocation among all parties.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC ( www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contact Steven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

Tags: CERCLA, Environmental Law

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SteveK April 12th, 2010

On April 5, 2010 the NJ in Buttitta v. Allied Signal, Inc. et.al. the Appellate Division affirmed the largest award in an asbestos/mesothelioma case in NJ. The jury awarded the plaintiff widow and family $8,000,000 for pain and suffering, $2,000,000 for loss of consortium, $9,281,660 for loss of earnings, $2,030,544 for loss of services and $3,000,000 to each of the three children for loss of parental care and guidance. The award against Borg-Warner and the Canadian mining company, Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. (ACL), was in addition to funds collected from settling parties, General Motors, Honeywell (for Bendix brake products) and C.L. Zimmerman a distributor of ACL asbestos. (This office represented Zimmerman, which settled during trial.) Borg-Warner and ACL challenged this significant award on numerous grounds, including causation, failure of the court to exclude testimony of numerous experts, and the failure of the court to allow the defendants to submit interrogatory responses of settled parties to the jury for the purpose of allocating responsibility to those settled parties, as well as the refusal of the court to include the settled parties on the verdict sheet, also for the purpose of allocating liability. ACL also challenged the striking of its defenses based upon their inability to produce certain documents required in discovery due to Canadian laws that prohibited production of the information requested.

The decedent, Mark Buttitta, had worked as a parts picker at a GM facility in summers while a student at Colgate University. His father had also worked at the same facility while Mark was growing up. It was claimed that Mark was exposed to asbestos from the parts and the accumulated dust in the GM parts warehouse, and also from the asbestos in the dust on his father’s clothing when Mark was growing up. Mark contracted mesothelioma in his early 50’s and died leaving a wife and three daughters in their teens and early 20s. Claims were asserted against the manufacturers and distributors of asbestos containing automotive parts including brakes and clutches, as well as the companies that mined and distributed asbestos to GM for the manufacture of brakes and clutches.

The Appellate Court affirmed all of the procedural and evidentiary decisions of the trial judge and the jury award. In doing so it concluded, based upon the uncontradicted expert testimony, that mesothelioma “is associated with the ‘the smallest’ exposure to asbestos and can develop from the cumulative effects of minimal and infrequent exposure.” The Court also affirmed the ruling that the responses to interrogatories of GM, which had settled before the start of trial, were not admissible by defendants under the rules of court, which permit use of interrogatories as statements of any party, since GM was no longer a party to the litigation. Borg-Warner, the court also held, “bore the burden of presenting a basis for allocation of percentages of fault in order to reduce its individual percentages of fault, which it failed to do.” In short, there was no evidence presented at trial to support the claims against the settled parties.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that it was correct that the settling parties were not included on the verdict sheet to permit the jury to allocate percentages of liability to any party other than the remaining defendants, Borg-Warner and ACL.

A significant question raised in this decision involves the ruling prohibiting the use of the interrogatories of settled parties to prove cross-claims so that the jury can assign liability to settled defendants.  This raises questions where joint defense groups are careful not to develop independent evidence to support cross-claims. This, of course, only present a question if parties settle during or immediately prior to trial when it is too late for the remaining parties to adequately develop the necessary evidence and expert testimony. In the usual case, independent settlement is always a possibility at any time. Accordingly, defendants will need to develop a manner to develop appropriate evidence to support cross-claims in the event they become the last party in a case.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC ( www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contact Steven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

Tags: Asbestos, Mesothelioma, Products Liability Defense, Toxic Torts

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