Archive for the tag 'Pollution'

NJ App. Div. Upholds NJDEP Power to Waive Applicability of Rules

SteveK April 5th, 2013

The Appellate Division recently handed down its decision in In re N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1, et seq., a case upholding the validity of certain rules promulgated by NJDEP which permit it under limited circumstances to waive the applicability of its own rules as to particular scenarios.  Further, the court invalidated certain forms and FAQs on the NJDEP website which purported to “fill in the gaps” in the aforementioned regulations on the basis that they constituted “de-facto rulemaking” in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.

In response to Executive Order No. 2 (“EO2”), which mandated that State agencies adopt waiver rules “to ensure that regulations shall be efficient, consistent . . . , accessible and transparent to all interested parties,” the DEP adopted regulations entitled “Waiver of Department Rules,” designated at N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1 to -2.4.  Thereafter, a group of environmental and labor organizations filed suit challenging this promulgation, arguing that the rules exceed DEP’s legislated authority and in any event are facially invalid due to the lack of adequate standards to guide the agency’s discretion and implementation.  They further challenged DEP’s guidance documents and other postings on its website created exclusively for the waiver rules after their adoption on the basis that they constituted de facto rulemaking in violation of the APA.

The challenged rules purported to “set forth the limited circumstances in which the [DEP] may, in its discretion, waive the strict compliance with any of its rules
in a manner consistent with the core missions of the Department . . . .”  N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.1.  To be successful in its application, it must comply with one of four threshold requirements: (1) “[c]onflicting rules”; (2) “strict compliance with the rule would be unduly burdensome”; (3) “net environmental benefit”; or (4) “public emergency,” as these terms are defined in N.J.A.C. 7:1B-1.2.

Next, the applicant must demonstrate that its waiver request does not fall within certain prohibitions expressed within the rules, largely pertaining to federal and state preemption, and various high-priority regulatory issues.  Further, no waiver may be granted that would conflict with any of DEP’s “core missions . . . to maintain, protect, and enhance New Jersey’s natural resources and to protect the public health, safety, and welfare, and the environment.”

Third, the application must satisfy various specific evaluation criteria, which will be considered with respect to any prospective waiver.  These criteria include (1) sufficient notice to the public; (2) sufficient information having been provided to DEP to support the waiver; (3) circumstances support the need for a waiver; (4) whether the applicant caused or contributed to the circumstances that resulted in the rule being unduly burdensome; (5) net environmental benefit; (6) consistency with core missions of the DEP; and (7) the existence of a public emergency.  N.J.A.C. 7:1B-2.2.

After these rules were adopted, the DEP posted a waiver rule “homepage” on its
website which included links to subpages providing additional and specific
information concerning waiver rule prohibitions, waiver rule guidance, public
notice requirements, FAQs and DEP contact information.  These pages also linked to information in a July 2012 “Guidance Document For Requests Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:1B” that provided specific instructions to waiver applicants, including what they should “consider,” and what statements, reports, demonstrations, or other evidence they needed to submit prior to DEP’s review and evaluation.

The appellants contended that these waiver rules are ultra vires because, although the Legislature has expressly authorized specific statutory exemptions in limited, “program specific” instances, there is no comprehensive legislative
scheme allowing for a broad, single-set relaxation rule of universal application.  DEP countered that such authority is implied in various enabling laws the agency has been mandated to execute and is incidental to the extensive regulatory powers vested in the agency by those laws.  Further, it was the DEP’s position that “[w]here the Department has the authority to promulgate rules, it also has the authority to modify or waive those rules, provided that the modification or waiver does not violate a statutory requirement or purpose.”

The court ultimately held that:

although specific enabling statutes direct DEP to promulgate rules for the regulatory program created therein, there can be no question, given the overall legislative scheme, that DEP is empowered to adopt regulations more ‘universal’ in nature and of more general applicability to deal comprehensively, in a single set of rules, with the sheer scope of overlapping statutory programs the agency must administer as well as with the volume of interconnected activities the Commissioner must coordinate amongst the agency’s various divisions.

Notably, however, the court was clear that

 

[t]he power to waive administrative rules may be used solely to deal with the unusual circumstances of an individual regulated party. It may not be invoked to implement wholesale changes in administrative rules, as applied to a large segment of regulated parties, which circumvent the rule-making requirements of the APA.

Accordingly, it is clear that “the power to promulgate a regulation implies the incidental authority to suspend or waive its application in certain limited, well-defined circumstances provided such exemption does not circumvent any legislative enactment or purpose, or federal law, is inconsistent with the agency’s statutory core mission and objectives, is accomplished through a properly adopted regulation pursuant to the APA, and establishes appropriate and clear standards for the exercise of agency discretion.”

With respect to the contents of the DEP’s waiver rule “homepage” on its website, however, the court held that this constituted an improper de facto rulemaking in violation of the APA.  These postings were described as “collectively detail[ing] DEP’s plans to develop internal processes and procedures to ensure consistency in its waiver decision-making, to create a priority system for its consideration of waiver requests, to expand transparency in noticing the receipt of applications for waivers, and to develop standardized submission forms.”  According to the court, these postings “go beyond merely facilitating administrative implementation of the rules,” and in fact to a certain extent “announce new substantive requirements.”  These postings did more than implement the waiver rules – they actually “establish[ed] the rules of the game.”  Because they were “integral, substantive components of the waiver
rules,” they were subject to the procedures required under the APA.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

The information contained in this blog is intended solely for informational purposes; it is a advertising publication of DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum P.C.This publication is intended to alert recipients of developments in the law and is not intended to provide legal counsel, advice or opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended as general information only. You are urged to consult a member of this firm or your own attorney concerning your particular situation and any specific legal questions you might have.

USEPA issues New Boiler MACT Regulations

SteveK April 5th, 2013

On December 21, 2012, the EPA issued a final set of rules under its Boiler Maximum Achievable Control Technology program (referred to as “Boiler MACT”).  These rules set emissions standards and impose maintenance and reporting requirements on the operators of an estimated 200,000 boilers and process heaters nationwide.
While the EPA states that its final rule “dramatically cuts the cost of
implementation” compared to earlier proposed versions of the rule while
affecting a minimal number of boilers and process heaters,
critics complain that the costs of compliance

Though the new rules set forth a variety of standards for boilers and process heaters, the most significant impact will be on those units fueled by biomass, coal or oil.  Rigorous emissions standards for suspended metals, carbon monoxide and hydrogen chloride have been put into place for these units, as well as requirements for regular tune-ups, depending on the total output of the unit.  Some facilities will further require a one-time energy assessment in order to identify cost-effective efficiency improvements.  Under this regulatory regime, boilers constructed after June 4, 2010 must be in immediate compliance while older boilers will be given a three-year grace period to conform to the new standards.

The affected boilers and process heaters are separated into two categories.  Under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), a “source” is another name for a stack, vent or opening that releases a pollutant – in this case, each boiler is considered a “source.” Pursuant to the Boiler MACT regulations, a “major source” is defined as a source which puts out ten tons per year of any one hazardous pollutant, or 25 tons per year of all hazardous air pollutants combined, whereas “area source” refers to all units that emit less than this amount.
The regulations identify 19 subcategories of boilers and heaters based
on unit design and fuel type, with each subcategory being subjected to a
different set of emissions standards.

For all major source units regardless of fuel type, as well as larger area source
units (10,000,000+ btu per hour) which are fueled by coal, oil or biomass, a
one-time energy assessment is required. This assessment is to include a visual inspection of the structural elements of the unit and the facility in which it is installed, a review of facility and unit operation and maintenance procedures, review of fuel usage, an inventory of major energy consuming systems and energy management practices.  Based on this assessment, recommendations for improvements in energy conservation and efficiency will be issued, including the cost of necessary improvements.

Tune-ups are required for most major source units, as well as those at area sources burning coal, oil or biomass.  The frequency of the required maintenance depends on the specific fuel type and unit design.  These tune-ups require inspection of the burner and flame pattern, calibrating the systems controlling air/fuel ratio, and optimization of carbon monoxide emissions.

To learn more, visit www.epa.gov/airtoxics/boiler/boilerpg.html.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

The information contained in this blog is intended solely for informational purposes; it is a advertising publication of DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum P.C.This publication is intended to alert recipients of developments in the law and is not intended to provide legal counsel, advice or opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended as general information only. You are urged to consult a member of this firm or your own attorney concerning your particular situation and any specific legal questions you might have.

NJ App. Div. addresses exemption under the Highlands Act for grandfathered approvals.

SteveK March 12th, 2013

In a recent decision, Intellect Real Estate Development v. NJDEP, the Appellate Division addressed a provision of the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act which provides an exemption for permits gaining certain approvals before a specified date.
Intellect Real Estate Development (“Intellect”) is the purchaser and prospective developer of a plot of land in Bloomingdale, New Jersey.  The nature of the intended development required Intellect to submit applications to both DEP and the Bloomingdale Board of Adjustment.  After some disputes between the Board and the municipal council, the proposed development was reduced from an eight-lot subdivision to only five lots, which was approved, but the approval was “expressly subject to and conditioned upon approval . . . by the Highlands Council.”
Simultaneously, Intellect sought DEP approval for its proposed development project.  After several submissions which DEP denied, new stormwater management regulations were enacted resulting in Intellect’s water quality calculations no longer being in conformance.  After Intellect submitted revisions, DEP stated that these new submissions “[met] storm water rules” and were ready for approval, pending certain other formal requirements being met.  At this point, Intellect went ahead with some site preparation on the property, drilling a well and constructing an access road.
On August 10, 2004, the Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act (the “Act”) went into effect.  Shortly thereafter, DEP sent Intellect a letter explaining that, based upon its preliminary review, the new law would affect the pending application.  Intellect was given two options: either resubmit the application “in accordance with the environmental standards contained in the new law,” or submit written documentation that “the proposed activity is exempt under the new law.”  Intellect notified DEP that it would not withdraw its application, and DEP later informed Intellect that its application was cancelled.
The matter was brought before an ALJ, who determined that “the Legislature intended that to be exempt from the [Act], major Highlands developments . . . must have received certain municipal approvals prior to March 29, 2004, regardless of what DEP approvals were applicable to the development,” and so “[Intellect’s] development is not exempt from the regulations imposed by” the Act.  The Commissioner of the DEP adopted the ALJ’s decision, and this appeal followed.
On appeal, Intellect argued for a construction of the Act by which Intellect would be eligible for an exemption on account of its timely-filed FWP application, which “should have been approved” before March 29, 2004, the date used in the Act to accord “grandfathered” status.  DEP, on the other hand, argued that such an exemption was not appropriate because Intellect failed to obtain municipal approvals by the relevant date, and accordingly it was irrelevant whether the FWP application was properly cancelled.
The court first noted that the stated purpose of the Act was to set forth “a comprehensive approach to the protection of the water and other natural resources of the New Jersey Highlands” through adoption of “stringent water and natural resource protection standards, policies, planning and regulation,” as well as “stringent standards governing major development” in the preservation area.  Toward that end, the Act “established a state agency, called the Highlands Protection and Planning Council . . . , which was delegated responsibility for land use planning in the Highlands Region” in various counties in the State.
N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a provides exemptions “from the provisions of th[e] act,” including subsection (3), which “grandfathered” certain developments by way of an exemption with various requirements.  Intellect argued that it was exempt from the Act if its application for a FWP was approved prior to March 29, 2004, regardless of whether it received municipal approvals before that date.  However, it being undisputed that municipal approvals were not received by that date, the court agreed with the DEP.
In reaching that conclusion, the court cited to two prior Appellate Division decisions for the proposition that “in order to qualify for a ‘grandfathered’ exemption, a development must have received a municipal approval under N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a(3)(a) and a DEP approval under either N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a(3)(b) or (c) if applicable, prior to March 29, 2004.”  In Lakeside Manor v. State, Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 421 N.J. Super. 362, 364 (App. Div. 2011), the court noted that the Act “contains a number of exemptions from its regulatory provisions, including one for any major Highlands development project that received one of a specified list of municipal land use approvals under the Municipal Land Use Law . . . and at least one of a specified list of permits issued by the [DEP] before March 29, 2004.”  In OFP, LLC v. State, 395 N.J. Super. 571, 590-91 (App. Div. 2007), the court explained that “N.J.S.A. 13:20-28(a)(3) provides an exemption from the . . . Act for any major development project that received the land use and  environmental permits specified therein on or before March 29, 2004.”
N.J.S.A. 13:20-28a(3)(b) requires that the applicant secure DEP permits in the stated categories, if applicable, and, if those permits were not required, then, under subsection (c), the applicant must secure one of those two listed permits, but only if they are applicable.  Thus, if none of the listed DEP permits applied, the applicant would be eligible for an exemption only if the municipal approvals had been secured prior to March 29, 2004.  The court made note that a developer who secures municipal approval of its project is inured with “important vested rights” under the Municipal Land Use Law, and the above-cited statutory provisions reflect recognition of this fact.  Accordingly, the Legislature intended only projects that received municipal approvals before March 29, 2004 to be eligible for “grandfathering” under the Act.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

The information contained in this blog is intended solely for informational purposes; it is a advertising publication of DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum P.C.This publication is intended to alert recipients of developments in the law and is not intended to provide legal counsel, advice or opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended as general information only. You are urged to consult a member of this firm or your own attorney concerning your particular situation and any specific legal questions you might have.

 

NJ Appeals Court addresses permits for combined sewer overflows.

SteveK March 12th, 2013

The Appellate Division recently handed down an opinion in In re Petition to Revoke Statewide General CSO Permit.  In that case, a group of private environmental watchdog groups brought suit to force the NJDEP to cancel certain Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) general permits issued to municipalities with combined sewer systems.
In 1994, the USEPA issued a national control policy for CSOs, which created a framework for controlling CSO discharges through the use of permits.  This policy provided what are known as the “Nine Minimum Controls” aimed at reducing the prevalence and impacts of CSOs without necessitating major construction or significant engineering studies.
In 2004, NJDEP issued a General CSO Permit to affected municipalities in accordance with these Nine Minimum Controls, which would allow those municipalities to operate their sewer systems and to discharge CSOs when necessary.  The General Permit went into effect on August 1, 2004, and was set to lapse on July 31, 2009.  However, prior to the expiration date, the affected municipalities requested an administrative extension, which, under N.J.A.C. 7:14-2.8(a), triggers a continuation of that permit’s effect until such a time as the extension is either granted or denied.  Accordingly, the 2004 permit remains in effect.  On April 15, 2011, the plaintiff environmental groups filed a written request that the NJDEP revoke and replace the General Permit with individualized permits involving tighter controls.
On September 15, 2011, NJDEP issued its final decision denying appellants’ request that the General Permit be revoked and reissued with conditions, stating that it did “not agree that this existing General Permit is inconsistent with State or federal law.”  Further, revocation was not necessary because NJDEP “intend[ed] to reissue the existing general permit with revised conditions to reflect the current status of the compliance with the nine minimum controls and Long Term Control Plan requirements.”  This appeal followed.
After the notice of appeal was filed, NJDEP advised that its plans had changed with regard to the General Permit.  Specifically, rather than reissuing a new General Permit, it would replace it with individual permits issued to each CSO owner, and to modify or renew existing individual permits to sewerage treatment plants that receive sewer flows.
The parties agreed that CSOs are a problem and that changes need to be made to the way the municipalities and sewer treatment plants which discharge them should be regulated, but they differed as to how that should occur.  The environmental group plaintiffs argued that the General Permit must be immediately revoked and simultaneously reissued, or replaced with individual permits, with a variety of new conditions to address their concerns.  NJDEP, on the other hand, argued that it would be a waste of time and resources to prosecute a revocation action against each of the affected municipalities when it was already in the process of issuing new individual permits to replace the disputed General Permit.
The court noted that N.J.A.C. 7:14A-16.6(a), which sets forth the valid “causes for revocation,” specifically states that the conditions therein are “causes for suspending or revoking a permit during its term.”  On the other hand, the General Permit at issue had expired and was on administrative extension, under which circumstances N.J.A.C. 7:14A-2.8 applies.  That provision gives NJDEP a variety of options, including revocation or replacement of the extended permit.  Accordingly, NJDEP’s action under these circumstances was fully supported by these regulatory provisions.
Further, the court agreed that “it makes little practical sense to initiate a costly and time-consuming revocation process against twenty-one municipalities when the General permit has expired and is on an administrative extension.”  Instead, “[b]y focusing on reissuing new individual permits, with more stringent conditions, DEP will make better use of its scarce resources and reach the same end result now sought by appellants.”  Ultimately, “there is simply no need for DEP to first revoke the General Permit in order to issue the new individual permits[;] [i]t may simply propose and issue the new permits.”
Finally, because the affected municipalities were not parties to the present appeal, and it did not even appear that they were notified of the request to revoke the General Permit, the court would be unable to grant the requested relief in the first instance.  “No permit can be revoked unless each permittee is given the opportunity to request a contested case hearing concerning the proposed revocation.”

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

The information contained in this blog is intended solely for informational purposes; it is a advertising publication of DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum P.C.This publication is intended to alert recipients of developments in the law and is not intended to provide legal counsel, advice or opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended as general information only. You are urged to consult a member of this firm or your own attorney concerning your particular situation and any specific legal questions you might have.

 

Courts Define Limits of EPA’s Control of Storm Water under Clean Water Act

SteveK February 13th, 2013

Recent decisions U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia and the U.S. Supreme Court define the limits of the extent to which authorities can control discharges of storm water under the Clean Water Act (CWA). On January 3, 2013, in Virginia Dept. of Transp. V. U.S. E.P.A., the Eastern District of Virginia held that the EPA is authorized to set Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL) of pollutants permitted to be discharged into bodies of water under the CWA; however, TMDLs do not apply to storm water carrying sediment, because storm water runoff is not a pollutant under the CWA.  As a result of prior unrelated litigation, the EPA was required to set TMDL limits for discharges into the Accotink Creek, a tributary of the Potomac River in Fairfax County, Va. , because the creek was determined to have “ ‘benthic impairments,’ which is to say the community of organisms that live on the bottom of the creek were not as numerous or healthy as they should be.” The EPA placed a limit on the flow of storm water into the creek due, in part, to a determination that the storm water contained sediment which is considered a pollutant. The Court analyzed the language of the CWA and concluded that although it authorizes the establishment of TMDLs for pollutants, and sediment is a pollutant, it could not place limits on storm water containing sediment because storm water is not a pollutant under the act. The Court concluded that Congress had been very specific in providing “precise standards and definite guidelines on how the environment should be protected” and does not extend the authority to the EPA to establish TMDLs for non-pollutants as surrogates for pollutants. Accordingly, the limits placed on the storm water flow rate into the creek were voided.Five days later, on January 8, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. NRDC 568 U.S. ___(2013) which held that a “discharge of pollutants” does not occur when polluted water flows from one portion of a navigable water body through “concrete channel or other engineered improvement” into another section of the water body.  In the case, the Flood Control District operates a “municipal separate storm sewer system” that collects and discharges storm water. The Court concluded that it does not qualify as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA, quoting from the Second Circuit decision, Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v.  New. York, 273 F. 3d. 481, 492 (CA2 2001) “…[i]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has not added soup or anything else to the pot.”These two decisions demonstrate an intention to strictly construe the CWA, and provide a practical, if not holistic, view of the hydrogeological systems. Although not specifically stated in Virginia DOT, storm water may be seen as a natural source of water that drains into navigable waters, and therefore, is not subject to discharge limits that would apply to industrial discharges into the same water body. This is supported by the Los Angeles Flood Control decision, which concludes that the collection and discharge of storm water does not constitute the discharge of a pollutant. Arguably, this concept should be able to be applied to sewage systems which have been authorized and controlled by governmental bodies, as they also are a part of the system of water collection naturally flowing into the regional water “drainage” into navigable waters.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

The information contained in this blog is intended solely for informational purposes; it is a advertising publication of DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum P.C.This publication is intended to alert recipients of developments in the law and is not intended to provide legal counsel, advice or opinion on any specific facts or circumstances. The contents are intended as general information only. You are urged to consult a member of this firm or your own attorney concerning your particular situation and any specific legal questions you might have.

 

NJ Federal District Court dismisses CERCLA Section 113 and private nuisance claim by subsequent property owner that conducted voluntary cleanup.

SteveK September 2nd, 2011

On August 13, 2011, the Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey continued to clarify the limits of Section 113 claims under CERCLA and  also addressed common law claims of a subsequent property owner in Queens West Development Corporation v. Honeywell International, Inc. Plaintiff acquired property formerly operated by Warren Chemical Works, which was subsequently acquired by Honeywell. The property was contaminated from discharges of substantial amounts of creosote, coal tar, and related substances. The property was to be redeveloped by plaintiff for residential, commercial and recreational uses. Plaintiff claimed to have incurred over $16 million in investigation and remediation costs, and anticipated total response costs that would be equal to or exceed $20 million. Defendant moved for dismissal of various counts of the complaint including claims in Count Two of the Complaint, under Section 113 of CERCLA, claims in Count Three for common law private nuisance, and claims in Count Four for restitution.  In deciding the case, the Court addressed the intersection between claims under ‘ 107 of CERCLA and Section 113. The Court noted that the case presented a unique issue: “whether a party that voluntarily undertakes a cleanup action can maintain a claim for contribution under § 113(f)(3)(B), when it has simultaneously asserted a claim for cost recovery under § 107(a).” The Court noted that courts have explained that Section 107 “authorizes the United States, a state, or `any other person’ to seek reimbursement for all removal or remedial costs associated with the hazardous materials on the property, provided that those actions are consistent with the National Contingency Plan, and that the United States Supreme Court held in Atlantic Research that the “plain language” of § 107 “authorizes cost-recovery action by any private party, including PRPs.” As a result, a private party is not required to establish its own liability in order to assert a claim under  Section 107. Section 113(f)(3)(B), however, allows the assertion of a right of contribution only “to PRPs that have settled their CERCLA liability with a [S]tate or the United States through either an administrative or judicially approved settlement.” Since Plaintiff had voluntarily incurred the response costs, is not a PRP, and did not enter into an approved settlement or resolved all their liability to the U.S. or the State of New York, they could not maintain the  Section 113 claim. Thus, the Court dismissed the  Section 113 claim contained in the Second Count.

The Court next addressed the claims for private nuisance. As the proceeding was in New Jersey, but involved New York property, the Court considered the law of private nuisance in both jurisdictions. The Court concluded that the law was the same, and that although a private nuisance “consists of an interference with one’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land” it only applies to interference with use of adjoining land, not to subsequent owners of the same property.

Finally, the Court refused to dismiss the restitution claim. Defendants argued that it should be dismissed since it is preempted by CERCLA. The Court refused to dismiss the claim, however, since it remained an alternative common law claim that would survive if the Plaintiff fails to prove the claim under  Section 107 of CERCLA.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis, Lehrer & Flaum, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

 

Steven Kunzman to Co-Chair Seminar on Groundwater Contamination

SteveK August 15th, 2011

Steve Kunzman, partner in the firm, will be a co-chair of a comprehensive conference:

Groundwater Contamination and Vapor Intrusion Cases

The seminar, which will be put on by Law Seminars International, will take place at the Sheraton Newark Airport Hotel on September 15 and 16.

For more information and to register go to: http://www.lawseminars.com/seminars/11GWATNJ.php

The speakers include noted attorneys, remediation consultants and and other noted experts in the field. The seminar is co-chaired by Ira Gottlieb of McCarter & English. Steven and Ira will also be speaking on insurance coverage issues relating to groundwater claims.

N.J. App. Div. rules that Spill Act liability requires a nexus between a discharge and the contamination of the surrounding environment.

SteveK July 5th, 2011

In NJDEP v. Ofra Dimant, et.al. the New Jersey Appellate Division recently confirmed that liability under the Spill Act, requires a connection between the discharge of a contaminant and the contamination of the environment of that contaminant that was caused by the discharge. In the case, the defendants included succession of owners and operators of a dry cleaning establishment. The contamination in the groundwater included the well known dry cleaning chemical, PCE, as well as the byproducts of its degradation: TCE and DCE.  There was evidence that the PCE was related to the dry cleaning operations. All but one of the direct defendants settled with the State.  The remaining defendant went to trial. The trial judge found that although there were discharges or releases of PCE during the stewardship of the remaining defendant, there was no proof that those discharges went through the asphalt and contaminated the environment.  Since there was no nexus between the discharge and the remediation, the claims against the defendant were dismissed. The State also sought leave to amend the complaint to add certain other prior operators. The denial of that motion by the trial judge was affirmed as being made too late in the case; in fact, it was made near the end of the trial.  This case affirms the need for the State or any plaintiff in a Spill Act case to demonstrate a nexus; and further reaffirms that there is no liability for passive migration of contaminants during the ownership of property.

 

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.

 

DOT held liable as an “arranger” under CERCLA for design and management of stormwater system.

SteveK November 10th, 2010

In United States v. Washington State Department of Transportation, the U.S. District Court in Washington recently held the Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) liable as an “arranger” of the discharge of hazardous materials under CERCLA.  The case involved a portion of the Commencement Bay-Nearshore Tideflats Superfund Site in Tacoma, Washington, known as the Thea Foss and Wheeler Osgood Waterways.  The U.S. contended that the WSDOT was responsible for contributing to the contamination at the site as an owner and operator of the highways and drainage structures, and as an arranger for the design and construction of the drainage structures that allowed contaminants to be discharged into the waterways.  The issues of the responsibilities and liabilities of the WSDOT were considered by the court in a series of motions decided from June through September.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the WSDOT designed the stormwater system with the specific purpose to discharge the highway runoff into the environment, knowing that the runoff contained hazardous substances.  The court further noted that the WSDOT could have designed the system to redirect, contain or treat the runoff, which would have avoided the discharges.

The WSDOT had also asserted that the discharge was a “federally permitted release,” and thus was exempt from CERCLA liability under ’107(j) as the drainage system was operated under a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The U.S. countered that there limitations of the permit had been exceeded and there were numerous unpermitted releases.  The court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to determine the scope of the permits and whether the resulting injury from any impermissible discharges was divisible.

This decision provides an expansive view of the concept of arranger liability based upon the Supreme Court decision in Burlington Northern, whereas other courts have been taking a more narrow view.  In most other matters, courts conduct a detailed analysis of the facts of the intent to discharge; whereas, in this decision, the factual analysis is somewhat limited.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC (www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department

District Court holds the Statute of Limitations for NRD claims under CERCLA is triggered by constructive knowledge of injury by Trustee.

SteveK July 17th, 2010

On July 13, 2010, in Commissioner of the Department of Planning and Natural Resources v. Century Alumina, LLC, et.al., the Federal District Court from the St. Croix division of the Virgin Islands, held that an action to recover natural resource damages (NRD) must be commenced within 3 years of the constructive knowledge of the injury by the trustee.

The plaintiff trustee brought the claim against a number of industrial entities for the release of contaminants onto a number of industrial tracts at various times which injured the land as well as groundwater and the Caribbean Sea.  The defendants moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claims under CERCLA’s limitation of actions provision, which provides that an action for NRD must be commenced within 3 years following “the date of the discovery of the loss and its connection with the release in question.” Although the statute does not state what is meant by “discovery” the court relied upon numerous prior decisions as to other statutes and other aspects of CERCLA to conclude that it is based upon the constructive knowledge of the trustee. The court went on to clarify that the knowledge of the agency, including the knowledge of any prior trustee, would be imputed to the present trustee.  Accordingly, the determination of whether there was NRD related to the discharges would require an analysis of when the trustee knew or should have known that there was an injury to the natural resource related to the discharges, which would commence the running of the time for bringing an action. With this ruling in hand, the court analyzed the facts as to each site and each defendant, dismissing some claims and allowing others to continue.

This case demonstrates that there courts will take a rational approach in considering the relationship between knowledge of a discharge of contaminants and the commencement of NRD claims. The interests of the government to pursue recovery of NRD, while important, will not allow the government to be inattentive to their statutory obligation to act promptly to seek to enforce these rights.

DiFrancesco, Bateman, Coley, Yospin, Kunzman, Davis & Lehrer, PC ( www.dbnjlaw.com ) is a full service law firm in New Jersey which provides a broad range of legal services, including the representation of clients in environmental and defense of toxic exposure matters. For additional information about the matters in this bulletin or in the firm’s environmental practice, please contactSteven A. Kunzman, Esq. who heads our Environmental and Latent Injury Litigation Department.